Functionalism

Is Functionalism a viable theory of the mind?

“Our minds are our brains” (D. Matravers OU course book 5, p45) This statement in itself sums up the usefulness of Functionalism and it’s forbearer Materialism in that they both explain where and what the mind is. In this essay I will be explaining how Functionalism evolved from Materialism and the advantages offered by this theory but I will also be considering how Functionalism fails to explain some aspects of the mind, namely a definition that is too broad and also the Qualia objection and how these objections cast doubt on Functionalism.

To begin with we need to consider Materialism and a good example is the sensation of pain. For instance, I break a tooth on a sweet and electrochemical signals travel up my jaw into my brain and according to scientists C fibres are stimulated, or fired, and that produces a sensation of pain. So, consequently, we get the conclusion that pain is identical to the stimulation of C fibres, which is part of the brain, and so our reaction and behaviour is then controlled by the brain as the pain is producing a certain brain state. This is the basics for the mind-brain identity theory as a certain state of mind has been produced purely through the physical aspects of the brain which then means that “our minds are our brains” (D. Matravers OU course book 5, p45)

But it could be a case that my brain might be slightly different to other peoples and instead of C-fibres being stimulated when the sensation of pain arises, D-fibres are stimulated instead. I could still act in the same way, have the same sensation and exhibit all the symptoms of, for example, a toothache but because D-fibres are stimulated instead of C-fibres, does that mean I am not experiencing pain? Indeed the Philosopher Hilary Putman summarises the problem by stating “He has to specify a physical-chemical state such that any organism (not just mammal) is in pain if and only if (a) it possesses a brain of suitable physical-chemical structure; and (b) its brain is in that physical-chemical state” (Putman, Western Philosophy, p260). This is known as the objection of multiple realisation and basically it means that the end result is the same, being in a state of pain but the state has been manifested by different means.

However the multiple realisation objection can be avoided by introducing Functionalism which in itself is just a small modification of Materialism. Probably the best way to explain Functionalism and how it differs to Materialism is by the use of Types and Tokens. To use an analogy, if I was to ask the question “what is an MP3 player?”, then I could be given two answers. One answer would be to say “that a MP3 player is a portable device that fits in a pocket and plays music” which is describing what a MP3 player does, it is a type of portable music player and we have described its function. The other answer could be to show an example of a MP3 player, an iPod, and because this device realises the role of an MP3 player it becomes a token example of MP3 players.

Now continuing with the theme of MP3 players, if we were to use the materialism theory then there could only ever be one type of MP3 player, an iPod, because the other MP3 players would be physically different and so consequently could not be called MP3 players. But we are aware that other MP3 players exist and so the theory falls foul of the multiple realisation objection. However the functional role of the MP3 player is to be a portable device that plays music and can state that a MP3 player is whatever realises that particular role, such as a mobile phone that has the ability to play MP3 files. So by using this definition Functionalism avoids the multiple realisation objection and even helps to incorporate the objection into being part of the theory.

So if we apply the same theory to the mind we can see how functionalism makes such a big difference as we are no longer bound to the narrow interpretation of Materialism. For instance, in the above example about toothache it could only be classified as pain if the C-fibres part of the brain were stimulated. But by using Functionalism it doesn’t have to be C-type fibres firing to produce pain, it can be another part of the brain which realises the functional role of producing the sensation of pain, for instance F-type fibres or Z-type fibres or any type of substance which has the role of producing an unpleasant sensation when my body is damaged. As Derek Matravers says “To switch from identifying the type of mental state, pain, with the type of brain state, C-fibres firing, to identify the type of mental , pain, with a functional role” (D.Matravers, OU Course book 5, p59)

So, to summarize, Functionalism does have advantages over the Materialism theory and also helps Materialism to evolve. Functionalism helps to solve the issues raised by the multiple realisation objection that is encountered in Materialism by using a definition of types and tokens and at the same time advances Materialism by actually incorporating the multiple realisation objection into being a central part of Functionalism. But there are two objections which still remain about Functionalism and both of these objections cannot ultimately be refuted by the theory of Functionalism. The first objection is that as where Materialism used a definition which is too narrow, functionalism uses a definition that is too wide as anything could be used to realise a certain brain state as long as the function is fulfilled. The other objection is the Qualia question which raises the issue that functionalism explains how, for instance, pain is created but it doesn’t say of how the subjective quality or the sensation of pain actually feels.

With the first objection it is good to consider a thought experiment created by the philosopher Ned Block. In this thought experiment he uses an extremely unlikely source to act as the source for the realisation of the state of mind. This source then fulfils the function of the brain and consequently show that Functionalism can still fall victim of the multiple realisation objection, but not from being too narrow an interpretation but by being too wide. In his thought experiment the entire population of china are each given a radio device and take on the role of being the equivalent to neurons. Whilst on the other side of the planet a person’s brain has been temporarily taken out of action and replaced by a device that is connected to the radio transmitters held by the Chinese people. Consequently when the radio transmitters held by the Chinese population are activated they will be producing the function of the brain and then also creating the reactions in the mind. Even though all of this sounds wildly implausible there is no objection that Functionalism can raise against it and refute it as we have identified the functional role of the brain and we have a way of realising that function. As Derek Matravers summarises “Block’s point is that some rather odd things could have the same functional role.” (D.Matravers, OU Book 5, p70)

However, one objection that could be raised would the time difference between cause and effect of the event and the realisation, for instance the body with the mind knocked out could fall down some stairs and an hour later the reaction could happen, but this time lag doesn’t interrupt the functional process, it just delays it. A good analogy is when using an old computer some programs run slow and take their time to perform their function but it does not stop them from working and performing their task.

The second objection to functionalism is the question of Qualia. Another aspect that the Chinese thought experiment highlights, is that even though Functionalism can be interpreted as being too wide of a definition it does not account for the subjective and experiential quality that is the feeling of pain. Matravers raises the point “There is a mental state we are trying to explain: the example we are using is pain. It is a conscious experiential state; an unpleasant feeling. Physicalist theories of the mind identify that mental state with something physical: the interaction between cells in the grey matter of our brains. However this does not seem to explain pain.” (D.Matravers, OU Book 5, p121) In short, Functionalism cannot account for our consciousness.

The American philosopher Thomas Nagel’s article titled “What is it like to be a bat” is a good account of the Qualia problem. In the article Nagel asserts that a bat has conscious experiences that are beyond that of a human because the way the bat uses echo location for navigation when flying and that these conscious experiences are entirely subjective and from a particular point of view or perspective. For instance, I can imagine what it is like to be a bat, I can imagine flying around in the dark avoiding obstructions by using echo location by relating the experience to sight, but I have no comprehension of what that experience feels like because I will be looking at the phenomenon from a human perspective and not a bat perspective. As Nagel states “Yet if I try to imagine this, I am restricted to the resources of my own mind, and these resources are inadequate to the task.” (T. Nagel, Western Philosophy, p266)

Of how this affects Functionalism is that I can learn about bat’s brains, behaviour and their physical construction, how their neurons fire and connect and how various chemicals interact within the bat’s brain. But I would not be able to discover the physical part or phenomenon which produces the conscious, subjective perspective of the bat and it is this objection that Functionalism cannot overcome. As Nagel also mentions “For if the facts of the experience – facts about what it is like for the experiencing organism – are accessible only from one point of view, then it is a mystery how the true character of experiences could be revealed in the physical operation of that organism” (T. Nagel, Western Philosophy, p267)

However it could be argued that the science of the brain is in its infancy and so because it is currently inexplicable doesn’t mean that it will always be inexplicable. Or it could be that the science of the brain is looking in the wrong direction and a paradigm change could be required to explain the phenomenon of consciousness. But this is a rather weak objection as it is relying on future events that could happen or not happen in equal measure and is trying to infer that because functionalism has overcome the other objections then it will overcome the Qualia objection eventually.

The other objection is that the Qualia experience is just a higher order mental state generated by the original mental state and is able to reflect on that mental state. But this seems implausible that a physical state, for example C-fibres firing, would create a brain state of pain and then that brain state would create another brain state that would be able to reflect on the experience of pain and produce a sensation that would be a human experience of pain from a human perspective.

So in summary Functionalism does provide answers up to a certain point. It can explain why we behave certain ways, for instance our behaviour when we feel pain, but it does fall victim of the two objections of becoming too broad an interpretation and also that it fails to account for our consciousness. It is these shortcomings of the theory that I personally think are its undoing and functionalism, or any of the Physicalist theories, fall short of being able to explain the phenomenon of consciousness. But with the alternative to Physicalism being Dualism and with the limitations inherent in that theory, namely the mind – body phenomenon, means that these questions are far from being resolved.

Bibliography.

Matravers, D. (2011) ‘Functionalism’ in ‘Mind’ OU course book 5, A22 Exploring Philosophy, Open University, Milton Keynes

Matravers, D. (2011) ‘The Problem of Conscioussness’ in ‘Mind’ OU course book 5, A22 Exploring Philosophy, Open University, Milton Keynes

Putnam, H. (1975) ‘Psychological Predicates’ in ‘Western Philosophy an Anthology’ Cottingham J.(2008)Blackwell Publishing, Oxford

Nagel, T. (1974) ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ in ‘Western Philosophy an Anthology’ Cottingham J.(2008)Blackwell Publishing, Oxford